



## **A Mixed Method Study on Gender Differentiated Drivers of Violent Extremism in Central Sahel**

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| Project Name:                   | A Mixed Method Study on Gender Differentiated Drivers of Violent Extremism in Central Sahel |
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## List of Acronyms

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|          |   |
|----------|---|
| ACLED    | Armed Conflict Location & Event Data  |
| AQIM     | Al-Qaida in the Islamic Magreb  |
| AMEP     | Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan   |
| APA      | African Information Agency  |
| AWP      | Annual Workplan   |
| CENI     | Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante<br>National Independent Electoral Commission |
| CVE      | Countering Violent Extremism  |
| EI       | État Islamique  |
| EIGS     | État Islamique au Grand Sahara  |
| FRC      | Field Research Coordinator  |
| ICF      | Informed consent form   |
| IDP      | Internally displaced persons  |
| IED      | Improvised Explosive Device   |
| IOM      | International Organization of Migration   |
| IRB      | Institutional Review Board  |
| JMIM     | Jama'a Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin   |
| LRP      | Local Research Partner  |
| MINUSMA  | The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali              |
| RFA      | Request for Applications  |
| UNCHR    | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees   |
| UNTM     | Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Mali  |
| USAID/WA | United States Agency for International Development/West Africa Mission                    |
| VE       | Violent Extremist   |
| VEO      | Violent Extremist Organization  |
| Y2       | Year 2  |

## A. Executive Summary

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FHI 360 is implementing a research project funded by USAID/West Africa (USAID/WA) focused on the Liptako-Gourma region shared by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. This project, *Gender Differentiated Drivers of Violent Extremism in Central Sahel* (hereinafter referred to as: *Sahel CVE Research*), is using mixed methods research to examine key drivers of violent extremism and their interactions with gender in the Liptako-Gourma region shared by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The final study will consist of: 1) a quantitative study examining the effects of individual characteristics and context on male and female attitudes towards VE; and 2) a qualitative study using data from different types of interviews (key informant, community level, and in-depth interviews) that unpacks the relationship between male/female attitudes towards VE and VE drivers. Together, the quantitative and qualitative components seek to provide a robust and evidence-based analysis of gender-differentiated VE drivers in the three target countries as well as actionable recommendations to USAID and their implementing partners.

The overarching research question for the two-pronged study is: *What are the key VE drivers in three Central Sahelian countries — Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — and how do these drivers differ by gender?*

### **Key Activities and Achievements**

- Submission of request for award modification to USAID/W
- Submission of subawards for local research partners to USAID for approval
- Submission and review of qualitative research to FHI 360 Institutional and Niger Review Boards
- Planning for training local research partners and field enumerators

### **Summary of changes in operating environment**

#### Coronavirus (COVID-19)

The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic continues to dominate headlines worldwide and presents numerous challenges — logistically and operationally as well as financially and technologically — to the safe implementation of project activities. More specifically, the African Union warned against a second wave of COVID-19 as Europe was experiencing an increase in cases and some countries on the continent were seeing an acceleration in the number of daily infections. "The time has come to prepare for a second wave," John Nkengasong, the director of the African Union's Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), told a press conference. In November and December, cases increased by an average of 6 percent each week across the continent and nine countries have contamination rates above 10 percent. Mali, in particular has been experiencing an increase in coronavirus cases for several weeks. From a few new cases daily, the number has risen to more than 150 cases per day; moreover, these statistics are said to be underestimated due to the very low testing capacity in-country. After considering more restrictive measures such as closing schools and restaurants or a night curfew, Mali's transitional government announced that it would strengthen prevention and patient care capacities.

With new variants of COVID19 quickly spreading around the globe (one of which was first identified in South Africa), concerns are also growing across the Sahel region. The FHI 360 project team will continue to monitor the sanitary and health situation in all three countries and will adapt project activities and protocols accordingly.

#### Burkina Faso:

Tensions were heightened, and security-related incidents and violent attacks increased during the current reporting period; it is believed this was because of the presidential and legislative elections that took place on November 22. Results of the presidential election indicate that incumbent president Kaboré will lead the

country for a second-term; however, he did not win a legislative majority. This may also have contributed to the increased tension. As of the writing of this report, there were two issues reported regarding the elections: i) a significant percentage of voting and/or polling stations did not open in many “grey” areas due to security concerns. Yet, the closed sites were in localities where security concerns are not particularly acute; and conversely, ii) Oudalan province, viewed as the most insecure, was able to open all their voting/polling sites.

### Mali

In Mali, as in Burkina Faso, the number and intensity of violent incidents has increased – and includes a coup d’état last August. In fact, according to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), 2020 has been the deadliest year, thus far. There has also been a concomitant rise in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), which, in turn, puts additional pressure on the communities to which the IDPs have fled due to limited resources, poor/insufficient governance, and pre-existing inter-ethnic/-community conflicts.

Humanitarian aid worker, 75-year old Sophie Pétronin, and politician Soumaïla Cissé, an opposition leader and considered a viable 2022 presidential candidate, were released from armed militant/extremist groups in October as part of a negotiated prisoner-swap. Pétronin had been held hostage since 2016 and Cissé for six-months during 2020. Approximately two-months after his release, Mr. Cissé was diagnosed with and died from COVID-19 while at a hospital in Paris where he had gone for treatment.

### Niger

Like its neighbors, Mali and Burkina Faso, Niger also saw heightened tensions and increased levels of violence mainly – as expected – along the shared border of these three countries; but also, as well, along Niger’s border with Chad and Nigeria. As in Burkina Faso, the increases during this quarter (i.e., October to December, 2020) have been attributed to the presidential and legislative elections that were held on December 27. As no clear presidential winner emerged, a run-off election is scheduled for February 21, 2021, during the next reporting period.

## **B. Context and Operating Environment**

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### **Burkina Faso**

#### **Security updates**

At the beginning of this quarter, the security situation in Burkina Faso remained generally tense as violent extremist organizations (VEOs) targeted civilians, public/private infrastructure and military/security forces alike. Reports show that in the northern region during the month of October, the situation was relatively “calmer” than previous months, as a total of 7 incidents involving unidentified armed men were reported.<sup>1</sup> However, the number of violent incidents increased as the Presidential and legislative elections, slated for November 22, drew closer.

In the Loroum province, more precisely in the Banhi department, unidentified armed assailants sabotaged the electrical installations of a public school, instructed the population to comply with “Islamic prescriptions,” and women to veil themselves or face reprisals, including possible expulsion from the village. The populations in this part of Loroum lack access to shelter, basic social services, housing, land and property<sup>2</sup>, with 118 out of 238 schools closed as of December 24, 2020.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> [Rapport Mensuel De Protection Octobre 2020 Region Du Nord](#)

<sup>2</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/report/burkina-faso/rapport-mensuel-de-protection-region-du-nord-octobre-2020>

<sup>3</sup> <https://lefaso.net/spip.php?article101711>

Botou department (or commune), in contrast, is located in the eastern region of Burkina Faso. Teachers in this commune have been targeted by armed men in protest against teaching the French language in schools, which led the teachers to flee and abandon their students. Today, more than 2,100 schools are said to remain closed because of terrorist threats in Burkina Faso.<sup>4</sup> North of Botou, in Seno province, at least 20 people were also reported killed in attacks on October 4-5. Armed groups attacked civilians in the villages of Demniol, Bombofa and Peteguersé in the commune of Gorgadji.<sup>5</sup>

Once known as "the city of leather", Kaya is now the second-ranked humanitarian center, after Djibo, in the country. Fleeing attacks by jihadist groups and intercommunal violence, more than 100,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) have found refuge in the city according to official figures; yet, according to the municipality, that number climbs to 400,000. As the country prepared for presidential and legislative elections on November 22, 2020, discussions about voting rights for those who fled the jihadist and inter-communal violence became more and more central.<sup>6</sup>

On November 11, 2020, 14 soldiers were killed in one of the deadliest and serious attacks on the army in Burkina Faso in the past 5 years. Carried out in the context of the November 22 presidential and legislative election campaign. The attack took place on the Tin Akoff-Beldiabé axis, in the province of Oudalan located in Northern Burkina Faso bordering Mali and Niger. Both the EI and JNIM claimed responsibility for the attack on social networks. In addition, for several weeks in November and December in the Soum province, bordering Mali, armed men took control of gold panning sites such as the Inata mine. Two artisanal miners were also killed at the Ara mine.<sup>7</sup>

The two maps on the next page show the security incidents reported in Burkina Faso for November and December 2020.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20201021-burkina-faso-le-d%C3%A9sarroi-enseignants-fuyant-la-menace-jihadiste>

<sup>5</sup> [Burkina Faso: 20 morts dans des attaques au nord du pays](#)

<sup>6</sup> [Au Burkina Faso, les déplacés sont les grands oubliés des élections de novembre](#)

<sup>7</sup> [Burkina Faso: dans le Soum, des hommes armés imposent leur loi aux orpailleurs](#)


<sup>8</sup> <https://julesduhamel.wordpress.com/>



## Security incidents in Burkina Faso

November 2020


SOURCES: ACLED, MENASTREAM  
CREDIT: Jules Duhamel (@julesdhl)



## Security incidents in Burkina Faso

December 2020

SOURCES: ACLED, MENASTREAM  
CREDIT: Jules Duhamel (@julesdhl)





In addition, governance issues coupled with abuse and corruption in law enforcement impacted the government's efforts to maintain and/or restore security and safety, including around the capital. In October, a report on corruption was published by the National Anti-Corruption Network (REN-LAC) following a local radio station's investigation of racketeering during road checks in Burkina Faso's capital. The report identified municipal and national police as the third most corrupt institutions in the country. Despite the insecurity, in the wake of the report, the director of Burkina Faso's national police suspended road checks in Ouagadougou and its region until December 15.<sup>9</sup>

### Political Updates

This quarter was an important political period for Burkina Faso because of the presidential and legislative elections, and dynamics around them. On October 22, the Constitutional Council published the final list of candidates for the November 22 presidential election. Thirteen candidates ran, including one woman named Yéli Monique Kam, a 47-year-old businesswoman and president of the *Movement for the Renaissance of Burkina Faso* (MRB), whose agenda included educational reform and peacebuilding. Also among the candidates were: the incumbent President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré; Zéphirin Diabré, opposition leader; Yacouba Isaac Zida, former Prime Minister of the transition in exile in Canada; and Eddie Komboïgo, president of the *Congress for Democracy and Progress*, the former ruling party.<sup>10</sup>

In advance of the campaign period, on October 26, candidates, media and civil society leaders, and activists signed a "good conduct" pact for a peaceful campaign and elections that was supervised by the Higher Council for Communication. The objective of this pact was to prevent electoral political discourse from negatively impacting social cohesion.<sup>11</sup> President Kaboré, candidate for a second term, launched his own campaign in Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Faso's second largest city, on November 5, promising "peace" to his constituency.<sup>12</sup> However, one day later, the mosque in the university of Kossodo, outside Ouagadougou was attacked.<sup>13</sup>

Electoral campaigns for the double elections began on October 31, in a particularly tense context. Given the insecurity and risk of VEO-led attacks, the National Independent Electoral Commission (*Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante*, CENI) developed and deployed a special security system for the 13 candidates in the presidential election, as well as for the candidates competing for the 25 seats in the National Assembly.

On Sunday, November 22, 6.5 million Burkinabè went to the polls to vote. In the legislative elections, 96 parties, five political organizations, and 25 independent groups, or 10,652 candidates, were competing for seats. 10,600 international and national observers were deployed on the ground.<sup>14</sup>

According to the provisional results, President Kaboré won the first round of the presidential election with 57.87% of the votes, thus securing his second term. Although re-elected for a second term, President Kaboré did not win a legislative majority and thus, will have to negotiate with allies and possibly opposition party representatives to secure a majority in the National Assembly.<sup>15</sup> While opposition party members acknowledged the provisional results, the political climate has become relatively tense in Burkina Faso in the weeks following the elections.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> [La police burkinabè suspend ses contrôles routiers à Ouagadougou](#)

<sup>10</sup> [Burkina Faso: 13 candidats en lice pour la présidentielle de novembre](#)

<sup>11</sup> [Burkina: signature d'un pacte de bonne conduite pour des élections apaisées](#)

<sup>12</sup> [Au Burkina Faso, le président Kaboré lance sa campagne](#)

<sup>13</sup> [« On a peur qu'ils reviennent » : craintes au Burkina Faso après l'attaque d'une mosquée](#)


<sup>14</sup> [Burkina Faso : les Burkinabè ont voté, malgré la menace djihadiste](#)

<sup>15</sup> [Burkina Faso : le président Kaboré devrait négocier pour former sa majorité](#)

<sup>16</sup> [Présidentielle au Burkina Faso: réélu, le président Kaboré entend prôner l'apaisement](#)



Two noticeable issues were reported in the preliminary analysis of the election results and which are illustrated in the map below. First, a significant percentage of voting and/or polling stations did not open in many “grey” areas due to security concerns. However, localities with the highest percentage of *unopened* polling stations were *not* located in the provinces considered the most insecure. In other words, the unopened stations were not, as expected, in the Mali-Niger-Burkina border area, but rather the Niger-Benin-Burkina Faso border area, where security concerns are usually less acute. Second, Oudalan province, on the border where Niger, Mali and Burkina meet and which is most exposed to insecurity, successfully opened all 68 polling stations, 50 in the commune of Gorom-Gorom. Additionally, the Yagha commune (near the Niger border), known for recurrent armed exchanges and incidents, was able to open its 20 polling stations.<sup>17</sup>




The top map on the next page, *Burkina Faso Presidential Election 2020 – Participation by Province*, shows that provinces in which the most votes were cast were, for the majority, those where many polling stations were not opened. A bottom map, also next page, seems to corroborate suspicions that the incumbent candidate scored higher in those “grey” areas where polling stations were unable to open.<sup>18</sup> However, as of this quarterly report, no appeals or complaints were registered by CENI regarding these discrepancies.

<sup>17</sup> <https://theconversation.com/election-presidentielle-au-burkina-faso-les-cartes-et-le-territoire-152116>

<sup>18</sup> <https://theconversation.com/election-presidentielle-au-burkina-faso-les-cartes-et-le-territoire-152116>


## Burkina Faso - Présidentielle 2020

Participation par province



## Burkina Faso - Présidentielle 2020

Pourcentage des voix obtenues par  
Roch KABORÉ par rapport aux inscrits



## Mali

### Security Updates

According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), 2020 has been the deadliest year, thus far, in Mali. Political instability, social and economic grievances, and security challenges have compounded the situation throughout the year.<sup>19</sup> Despite government and international efforts to contain VEO attacks, particularly while the country was transitioning after the August coup d'état, several incidents broke out in different regions, targeting primarily civilians but security forces and peacekeepers as well.

In mid-October, multiple attacks were launched in central Mali by suspected Islamists, days after they had been released from prison by the interim government in a prisoner swap. In the attacks, which were the deadliest since the coup d'état, 25 people – including 13 Malian military and more than a dozen civilians – were killed<sup>20</sup>. Three days later, on October 15, there were two separate attacks on the same day against peacekeepers of MINUSMA, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. In the first, an Egyptian peacekeeper was killed and another seriously injured when an explosive device struck their vehicle in the northern region of Kidal. The second attack occurred in Timbuktu, where at least one Burkinabé peacekeeper was injured in a fire attack on a MINUSMA camp.

At the end of October, about 60 jihadists were killed in the north of Mali in an operation carried out by the Barkhane force. According to French officials, the operation neutralized “the equivalent of a katiba”, affiliated with AQIM and operating near the border with Burkina Faso.<sup>21</sup> The village of Minimakanda was attacked twice in two days, November 19 and 20. Local sources reported that four to eight people were killed, part of the village was burned, and livestock were stolen. Roughly 100 families have since taken refuge in neighboring localities.<sup>22</sup>

On November 30, foreign and Malian forces were attacked simultaneously in Ménaka, Gao, and Kidal, according to Malian and foreign military sources. No casualties were reported after what appeared to be a coordinated operation against the camps of the Barkhane forces, UN peacekeepers, the European force Takuba and against the Malian army.<sup>23</sup> In December, an ambush against a national guard bank escort convoy between Konna and Douentza, in Mopti, left 2 soldiers killed and 16 wounded.

The situation was also very tense during this reporting period in the cercle of Niono, in the Segou region, in the village of Farabougou (~ 2,000 inhabitants), which was besieged for more than 4 weeks by jihadists who surrounded the village, barred access and destroyed a bridge.<sup>24</sup> The siege began when militants, who have generally sided with Fulani herders in their conflicts with farming communities such as the Bambara, kidnapped several villagers and clashed with local hunters.<sup>25</sup> About ten days after Malian soldiers entered the village, jihadists opened fire again at youth who were cutting brush on the outskirts of the village and at the Malian soldiers who were also confined in the village.<sup>26</sup> The situation in Farabougou, where the majority of the population is of Bambara origin, made plain the Malian government's difficulties in asserting authority where VEOs are gaining ground as well as its inability to ease inter-community conflicts. In December, the Islamic High Council undertook mediation efforts after a reconciliation forum held in October failed to show results.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> <https://acleddata.com/2020/12/17/mali-any-end-to-the-storm/>

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.france24.com/en/20201013-dozens-killed-in-spate-of-attacks-in-central-mali>

<sup>21</sup> [Mali: près de 60 jihadistes tués dans une opération de la force Barkhane](#)

<sup>22</sup> [Mali: une double attaque à Minimakanda prolonge le cycle de violence dans le cercle de Bankass](#)

<sup>23</sup> [Mali: 3 sites des forces maliennes et étrangères ont été attaqués dans le nord](#)

<sup>24</sup> [Mali: les jihadistes continuent d'imposer leur loi à Farabougou de plus en plus isolé](#)

<sup>25</sup> [L'armée malienne approvisionne par voie aérienne un village assiégé](#)

<sup>26</sup> [Mali: un soldat tué dans une attaque à Farabougou](#)

<sup>27</sup> [Mali: une médiation avec jihadistes et chasseurs dozos pour mettre un terme aux violences](#)

Underscoring the tenuous security environment was the release of French humanitarian aid/charity worker, Sophie Pétronin, and Malian politician Soumaïla Cissé who had been held hostage since March 2020 in Northern Mali by JNIM. Their release, announced on October 5, was part of the negotiations in which more than 200 hundred convicted or presumed jihadists were freed,<sup>28</sup> stirred considerable controversy in Mali and internationally.<sup>29</sup> Citizens in Mali as well as neighboring Burkina Faso expressed concern that the release of so many extremists would lead to increased violence in their communities.<sup>30</sup> The question of whether negotiating with VEOs should be considered continues to be of high importance and controversial as the presence of international military forces expands.<sup>31</sup> This core question of negotiation or not is illustrated by the different positions of Malian and French authorities. On one hand, Prime Minister Moctar Ouane stated that Malian people demand dialogue, including with VEOs<sup>32</sup>; yet, French President Macron has publicly rejected talks with jihadi groups<sup>33</sup>. Shortly after his release from captivity, Mr. Cissé contracted COVID-19 and died on December 25 in a Paris hospital where he had been taken for treatment.<sup>34</sup>

Inter-ethnic tensions between Fulani semi-sedentary herders, Tuareg nomadic herders, and Bambara farmers remain fraught. Every year, Fulani herding communities leave Segou province for other regions such as Karei (inhabited mainly by Bambara), Mema (mainly populated by Tuareg), and Nampalari (home to Fulani). At the crossroads of these regions is the Méma transhumance crossroads, which hundreds of herders join every year at the beginning of the winter season. Often, intra- and inter-community tensions escalate into outright conflict, mainly over resources and which are exacerbated by climatic events, the absence of governance (i.e., administration and armed forces), and the insecurity caused by jihadists.

Also during the quarter, tensions between the VEOs themselves escalated as new clashes between Al Qaeda (AQIM) and the Islamic State (*Etat Islamique*, EI) broke out in the Gourma region. Localized clashes and targeted assassinations/ambushes between VEOs also erupted in the communes of Indelimane, Ntillit and N'Daki in the Gao region.<sup>35</sup>

In December, the Da Na Ambassagou ("hunters who trust in God" in the Dogon language) self-defense militia (made up of traditional Dozo hunters), which the Malian state had officially disbanded last year yet which had voiced separatist threats, issued a video ultimatum to the Malian transitional government demanding the army's presence in Dogon country. The video further accused authorities of abandoning and deserting the *cercle* of Bankass after an attack in which 11 soldiers were killed by AQIM in October. The leader of the militia threatened to personally join a jihadist group if the army did not protect the Dozo hunters by 20 December.<sup>36</sup> Additional reports indicate that other militia leaders such as Soumaïla "Ladji" Ganamé have voiced support for Da Na Ambassagou. Ganamé also called on Dogon hunters in Burkina Faso and Mali to rise up against VEOs themselves.<sup>37</sup>

Two maps from ACLED, for November and December 2020, on the following page, show the type and location of security incidences in Mali.

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<sup>28</sup> [Au Mali, plus de 100 djihadistes libérés en vue d'un éventuel échange](#)

<sup>29</sup> [Le Burkina Faso oscille entre joie et inquiétude après la libération des otages détenus au Mali](#)  
<sup>30</sup> [ibid](#)

<sup>31</sup> [Mali : La Belgique veut envoyer 250 militaires pour Barkhane](#)

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.france24.com/fr/%C3%A9missions/l-entretien/20201203-le-dialogue-avec-les-terroristes-est-une-volont%C3%A9-des-maliens-assure-le-premier-ministre-du-mali>

<sup>33</sup> <sup>1</sup> <https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/sahel-avec-les-terroristes-on-ne-discute-pas-declare-macron-20201120>

<sup>34</sup> <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-25/soumaila-cisse-mali-politician-who-was-held-hostage-dies-at-71>

<sup>35</sup> [Mali: nouveaux affrontements entre al-Qaïda et l'État islamique](#)

<sup>36</sup> [Mali: affaibli, le chef de la milice Dan Na Ambassagou interpelle les autorités de transition](#)

<sup>37</sup> <https://julesduhamel.wordpress.com/>






## Security incidents in Mali

November 2020

SOURCES: ACLED, MENASTREAM  
CREDIT: Jules Duhamel (@julesdhl)



### Jihadist activity

- Armed clash
- Reported clash between jihadist groups
- Violence against civilians
- Explosive / Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
- Mortar or rocket attack
- Abduction
- Looting and/or property destruction

### Security forces activity

- Armed clash (Barkhane or Barkhane & FAMA)
- French airstrikes

### Militia activity

- Armed clash
- Violence against civilians
- Abduction

### Unidentified armed group

- Armed clash
- Violence against civilians
- Explosive / Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
- Abduction
- Looting and/or property destruction


### Other

- Mob violence or violent demonstration

### Fatalities by region

| Region                | Fatalities |
|-----------------------|------------|
| (Only top five shown) |            |
| Mopti                 | 61         |
| Gao                   | 30         |
| Segou                 | 22         |
| Menaka                | 5          |
| Kayes                 | 4          |
| <b>Total</b>          | <b>125</b> |


### Fatalities by month



### Type of violent incidents




### Fatalities



## Security incidents in Mali

December 2020



### Actors

- Security forces
- External forces (France/MINUSMA)
- Jihadist militants
- Militias
- Unidentified

### Type of incidents

- Armed clash
- Violence against civilians
- Airstrike
- Mortar or rocket attack
- Abduction
- Improvised Explosive Device or Grenade
- Looting or property destruction

### Fatalities by region

| Region       | Fatalities |
|--------------|------------|
| Tombouctou   | 69         |
| Mopti        | 41         |
| Gao          | 16         |
| Segou        | 16         |
| Menaka       | 1          |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>143</b> |


### Fatalities by month (Jan. to Dec. 2020)



### Type of incidents



### Fatalities



## Political Updates

In late September, the end of the prior reporting period, transitional president Bah N'Daw appointed Moctar Ouane as prime minister. Eight days later, on October 5, a new government was formed in which members of the junta kept strategic ministries such as: defense, security, territorial administration and national reconciliation.<sup>38</sup> The vice-president of the transition, Colonel Assimi Goïta, and leaders of the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) announced on October 7 the release of the twelve civilian and military individuals arrested during their coup d'état.<sup>39</sup>

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) lifted sanctions it had imposed on Mali on October 6, in order to "support" the transition that was supposed to bring civilians back to power. In addition, on October 9, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) lifted the suspension which had been imposed on Mali since August 19, following the coup d'état. Consequently, Mali was again allowed to participate fully in all activities of the African Union.

The new government re-mapped and increased the number of Mali's regional divisions from 15 to 20. Assimi Goïta, who led the coup and is currently vice-president of defense and security affairs, worked with the Minister of Territorial Administration, a former classmate, to select and appoint 13 soldiers to each lead a region. Seven civilians will govern the remaining seven regions. In Mali, the regional governor is the representative of the central government at the regional level.<sup>40</sup>

By the end of the quarter, tensions on the composition of the future National Transitional Council (*Conseil National de Transition*, CNT) intensified due to ongoing conflict between the National Council for the Salvation of the People (CNSP), political parties and civil society. Several political parties and unions boycotted the CNT and denounced both the mode of appointments and the quotas reserved for them in the decrees published on November 10 by the transitional authorities.<sup>41</sup> According to the decrees, only 11 of the 121 seats on the CNT would go to the political parties, compared to 22 seats for the defense and security forces.

After the appointment of a president, a prime minister and a transitional government between late September and early October, the authorities had yet to create the third legislative body for this transitional period.<sup>42</sup> The CNT is supposed to act as a transitional parliament, bringing back civilian rule, until the next elections are held, according to the transition roadmap. On December 2, Mali's military-dominated authorities announced the members of the CNT in response to the growing impatience with the new regime and the preponderance of the military in all essential governmental positions. On December 5th, Colonel Malick Diaw, number two in the junta, was elected head of the CNT.

The political class, civil society, and armed groups alike have criticized the composition and process of setting up the assembly because its members are not elected,<sup>43</sup> the military's overrepresentation, and exclusion of some political parties and armed groups<sup>44</sup>. An ad hoc committee is already in charge of drafting the rules of procedures, but this does not seem to ease the tensions caused by the appointments and allocation of seats.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> [Au Mali, des militaires aux postes-clés du gouvernement de transition](#)

<sup>39</sup> [Mali : libération des personnalités civiles et militaires arrêtées lors du coup d'Etat](#)

<sup>40</sup> [Mali: nomination massive de militaires à la tête des régions](#)

<sup>41</sup> [Le Mali au bord d'une nouvelle crise politique](#)

<sup>42</sup> [Le Mali accouche avec peine d'un organe législatif de transition](#)

<sup>43</sup> <https://acleddata.com/2020/12/17/mali-any-end-to-the-storm/>

<sup>44</sup> <https://www.dw.com/fr/mali-les-militaires-surrepr%C3%A9sent%C3%A9s-au-cnt/a-55569453>

<sup>45</sup> [Mali: le fonctionnement et les priorités du Conseil national de transition](#) and <https://www.theafricareport.com/50822/mali-calls-to-boycott-national-transitional-council-grow-louder/>

The *Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Mali* (UNTM), the country's leading trade union organization, called on all workers to observe a 3-day strike from November 18 - 20 and a 5-day one from December 14-18.<sup>46</sup> The demands of the UNTM are: harmonization of public service wage indices, bonuses and allowances, or the fate of compressed workers, those employees of former nationalized state-owned enterprises. The UNTM strike in October had sharply slowed activities, particularly in banks, mines and certain public services in Bamako and the regions.<sup>47</sup>

U.S. military assistance to Mali's transitional government following the August putsch will remain suspended until an elected government is in place. Such a government is not expected to take office for at least 15 months, the deadline set by the new Malian authorities for the political transition period that is expected to lead to general elections and the return of civilians to power.<sup>48</sup>

## **Niger**

### **Security Updates**

Violent incidents continued to occur during this reporting quarter, mainly in the border areas with Burkina Faso and Mali but also in border areas with Chad and Nigeria. The two maps from ACLED on the following page show the type and locations of the incidents.<sup>49</sup>

In November, Imam Abarchi Chamsou was assassinated in the village of Chinagodrar, Tillabéri region, roughly 10 km from the Malian border. Unidentified armed men, mostly on motorcycles, came and took the entire village hostage; an estimated 15 people were seriously injured. Three weeks earlier, these armed men gave the villagers an ultimatum to leave the village on Banibangou. The resistance was led by the Imam and his assassination was a last warning for the villagers. Since then, at least 2 Nigerien security forces were killed and 2 others have been abducted, following an attack in the Tillabéri region.

At least 27 people were killed the night of Saturday, December 12 into the early morning of Sunday, December 13, in an attack attributed to the jihadists of Boko Haram in southeastern Niger, in the village of Toumour, Bosso department, Diffa region, a few hours before the opening of municipal and regional elections in the country, and two weeks before the presidential elections. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) reported that 28 people were killed and hundreds wounded, and warned about the safety of more than 30,000 refugees and IDPs who have taken refuge in Toumour. In another instance, in December, ISGS burned a CENI vehicle carrying ballot boxes between Banibangou and Dey Koukou, before attacking villagers who protested: 8 were reportedly killed and granaries destroyed by fire.

A couple of days later, armed individuals riding motorcycles attacked the village de Tounkoussou (Anzourou commune), killing 1 villager and stealing all cattle and animals.

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

<sup>46</sup> <https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/mali-la-principale-centrale-syndicale-annonce-une-nouvelle-gr%C3%A8ve-de-5-jours/2074417>  
<https://www.dw.com/fr/la-gr%C3%A8ve-dans-plusieurs-secteurs-divise-au-mali/a-55965495>

<sup>47</sup> [La principale organisation syndicale appelle les Maliens à cinq jours de grève](#)

<sup>48</sup> [L'aide militaire américaine aux Maliens suspendue jusqu'à des élections](#)

<sup>49</sup> <https://julesduhamel.wordpress.com/2020/12/18/map-of-security-incidents-in-niger-november-2020/>





## Political Updates

Mahamadou Issoufou intends to voluntarily leave power at the end of his two, 5-year terms as President. This will be the first time in 60 years that there has been a transition from one democratically elected president to another in Niger.<sup>50</sup>

On November 13, Niger's Constitutional Court published the list of candidates for the December 27 presidential elections and announced that Hama Amadou, the opposition leader of the *Mouvement Démocratique Nigérien pour une Fédération Africaine* (Nigerian Democratic Movement for an African Federation, MODEN/FA), was ineligible. The Constitutional Court rejected his candidacy without explaining or justifying their decision. Hama Amadou, a two-time former prime minister, came in second in the presidential election of 2016 and then had been sentenced in 2017 to one year in prison on charges of child trafficking which many have deemed controversial and political.<sup>51</sup>

The electoral campaigns for the presidential and legislative elections were launched in early December, with thirty candidates competing for the presidency and 359 individuals for the 171 Parliamentary seats.<sup>52</sup> The Niger presidential and legislative elections were held on December 27, 2020; a second round for the presidential election is planned for February 21, 2021. According to preliminary results, Mohamed Bazoum and opponent Mahamane Ousmane qualified for the second round.<sup>53</sup> However, the full provisional results of the elections were not published as of the end of the quarter; they should be issued by January 2, 2021.<sup>54</sup>

Niger's National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) released the provisional results of the communal and regional elections held on December 13. According to these results, the Niger Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS-TARAYYA), the main party in power, came out on top and secured 1,799 of the 4,246 seats in the communal elections. The PNDS-TARAYYA also secured 62 of 200 available seats at the district level and 39 of the 117 seats at the city level.<sup>55</sup> The Constitutional Court will have to examine and validate these results, although no political party has officially declared its intention to file an appeal. A few political parties, including some allies of the ruling party, have issued statements and press briefings denouncing irregularities in some voting polls. However, while the elections were held in a relatively calm context, there are tensions surrounding issues of eligibility, which were noted in a recent report by the Clingendael Institute:

*“political leaders and the country’s institutions, is a threat that may result in political instability and weigh on the country’s social cohesion. Analysts have already noted that mass post-electoral violence is unlikely. What is at stake, however, is confidence in political institutions in Niger, which is likely to be further undermined if the race is not perceived as free and fair.”*

The report continues:

*“The fact that Issoufou is willingly leaving the political scene after his two constitutionally allowed mandates, in contrast to his recently deceased predecessor, Mamadou Tandja, does not negate that for many in the opposition, five more years of PNDS rule will be tough to stomach. Additionally, the fact remains that PNDS is likely to stay in power, which will not create the conditions under which Issoufou’s policies and corruption scandals are likely to be*

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<sup>50</sup> [Sur le départ, le président du Niger appelle à ne pas « tripoter » les Constitutions](#)

<sup>51</sup> [Présidentielle au Niger : Qui sont les candidats ?](#)

<sup>52</sup> [Niger: coup d'envoi de la campagne électorale pour les élections générales du 27 décembre](#)

<sup>53</sup> <https://www.ceniniger.org/presidentielle/>

<sup>54</sup> <https://www.ceniniger.org/presidentielle/>

<sup>55</sup> <https://www.ceniniger.org/presidentielle/>

*held to account. Continued government refusal to address corruption and failed development policies will further feed a lack of trust in state institutions.”<sup>56</sup>*

## C. Project Management and Communications

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### **Deliverables**

There were no contractual deliverables due or submitted this reporting period.

### **Communications and Outreach**

The FHI 360 Technical/Project Manager holds bi-weekly calls with USAID/WA’s AOR and alternate AOR to ensure smooth operations and up-to-date knowledge given the fluid operating environment. As needed, operational backstop personnel and/or technical staff from FHI 360 join the calls to provide additional information.

During this reporting period, the two main topics discussed on the bi-weekly calls with USAID/WA were the local research partner subawards and revised program description which triggered a modification of the cooperative agreement between FHI 360 and USAID/WA. These points are elaborated on in the following subsections as well as Section D/Quantitative and Qualitative Studies, page 18.

The newsletter published by the USAID/West Africa Regional Peace and Governance Office (USAID/WA/RPGO) included a summary of and links to the Quantitative Study which was completed and approved last quarter. The study, *Perceptions of VE Drivers: A Quantitative Analysis*, is available in both [English](#) and French on USAID’s Development Experience Clearinghouse.

On November 23<sup>rd</sup>, the FHI 360 technical team held a call with staff from the Clingendael Institute and Mercy Corps, whose organizations also received awards under the same Annual Program Statements (APS) as FHI 360 from USAID/WA. The technical teams from each organization provided project updates and discussed challenges that had arisen in their projects’ rollout. Specific topics discussed included: how to reduce risk to traditional leaders who are interview participants, given they are sometimes targeted by VEOs; how to get quality information from interviews; and how to manage virtual trainings.

In terms of reducing risk to traditional leaders and obtaining quality data, Clingendael technical staff offered the following suggestions: remove requests for names of traditional authorities; frame questions more generally and not in reference to specific individuals; ask about “shocks” instead of particular attacks by VEOs; and frame the goal of the study as ‘enhancing the role of traditional authorities in their communities’. The team offered other suggestions to reduce risk in data collection, such as: conducting interviews outside of the public domain, in secure locations; conducting trial interviews; and using hyper-local research teams. Staff noted that most concerns about the data collection tools came from Tillaberi, where conflict has become a ‘shameful’ issue that communities do not want to discuss.

With regard to conducting virtual data collection trainings, technical staff described challenges in timing, specifically that it took longer than anticipated to get the training going, and recommended building sufficient time into trainings to manage logistical and communication hurdles. They also noted that enumerators struggled to ask follow-up questions and recommended building deliberate pauses into interviews and examining pilot data together with enumerators to see where the data was insufficient.

In addition, the technical teams from all three organizations discussed opportunities for information-sharing. FHI 360 shared its proposed list of communities and partners, as well as the completed quantitative study and

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<sup>56</sup> <https://www.navantigroup.com/news-1/2020/12/18/elections-in-niger-casting-ballots-or-casting-doubts>

literature review (both in English and in French). Mercy Corps shared its baseline qualitative and quantitative reports, qualitative tools, a summary brief, and a social cohesion guide for practitioners. As noted above, the Clingendael Institute shared lessons learned about implementing virtual trainings and safety/security measures.

## **Program Management**

### **Revised Program Description and Award Modification**

During the bi-weekly calls with USAID/WA, the FHI 360 technical team discussed the possibility of changing how some of the field data would be collected due to the insecure operating environment following attacks in Niger and a coup d'état in Mali during the month of August, 2020. The recommended changes were based on robust, separate conversations with the three proposed local research partners, technical advisors in FHI 360's Research & Evaluation department, and representatives from FHI 360's OIRE. There was strong consensus that convening focus group discussions would draw too much attention and potentially put participants at risk. Instead, FHI 360 and the proposed partners determined that the same type of qualitative information could be obtained through in-depth interviews with a sufficient number of individuals in each target community.

The proposed changes were sufficiently different enough from the program description within the signed award, to trigger an award modification. Therefore, on November 19, 2020, FHI 360 submitted a revised program description to USAID/WA describing the changes in how qualitative data would be collected in the field. The modification is currently pending.

### **Subawards for Local Research Partners**

A request for approval of three subawards was submitted to the Agreement Officer of the Sahel CVE Research, based in the USAID/West Africa regional mission on December 17, 2020. The request is still pending. A collateral impact of the delay in finalizing subaward, was on our local research partner in Niger. The research director had to accept another opportunity, thus our LRP had to find a replacement.

## **D. Quantitative and Qualitative Studies**

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### **Quantitative Study:**

The Quantitative Study was submitted to and approved by USAID/WA during the last reporting period.

### **Qualitative Study:**

#### **FHI 360 and Niger Institutional Review Boards**

In this period, the technical team submitted full research protocols, including data collection tools and informed consent forms (in English and in French) to FHI 360 Office of International Research Ethics (OIRE), which manages the institutional review board processes<sup>57</sup>. Through virtual meetings and written correspondence with the OIRE, the technical team revised the protocols and consent forms (revisions to the data collection tools were not requested). In December, the OIRE determined that the FHI 360 proposed study was exempt from a full review as "adequate provisions to protect the privacy of participants and to maintain confidentiality of the

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<sup>57</sup> [The purpose of an IRB review is to assure, both in advance and by periodic review, that appropriate steps are taken to protect the rights and welfare of humans participating as subjects in the research.](#) To accomplish this purpose, IRBs use a group process to review research protocols and related materials (e.g., informed consent documents and investigator brochures) to ensure protection of the rights and welfare of human subjects of research. Further, as a recipient of USAID funding, under HHS and USG regulations, FHI 360 takes seriously the IRB processes to ensure the safety of research participants as well as the safeguarding of all data.

data have been satisfied”, and approved it, in accordance with 45 CFR 46.104(d) (2)(iii) and (d)(3)(i)(C). Please see Annex I for the letter “Exempt Research Determination.”

The technical team also prepared the document package to be submitted to the Nigerien ethics committee, *le Comité d’Ethique Interministeriel basé au Ministère de la Santé*, which is the Niger equivalent of an IRB. The required materials were virtually the same as those required for FHI 360’s institutional review board, except for the addition of “une fiche descriptive de la personne physique ou morale.” The dossier will be submitted early in the next quarter (i.e., January 2020). Bank strikes in Mali in November and again in December meant the required payment to accompany the submission was delayed.

### Shifts in proposed target communities

Following recommendations from USAID/Niger to diversify the target regions of our study and avoid focusing on one region (e.g., Tillabéri as per our initial selection), our quantitative analytic expert, Dr. Gabriel Katz, conducted an additional analysis to select equivalent communities<sup>58</sup>. The FHI 360 technical team sought a balance between feasibility, mitigating risk, and adhering to the community selection criteria – namely, needing high-risk communities and low-risk communities. Some of the initially desired/proposed high-risk communities were not feasible as the potential of putting participants in jeopardy was too great. The additional analysis allowed us to propose Nguigmi, a community in the Diffa region, for the community at high-risk for VE and Anzourou, a community in the Tillabéri region, at low-risk for VE.

In Burkina Faso, and as part of the team’s continuous monitoring of the security situation in the target countries of the study with our local partners, the technical team decided to re-run another analysis excluding the regions of Soum and Oudalan which have witnessed an escalation in insecurity. For the final selection, FHI 360 proposed Gorgadji/Bouloye-Siguidi community within the Seno region as the community at high-risk for VE and Dori/Selbo as the community at low-risk for VE.

### Training plan for field-based research teams

In this period, the technical team also prepared training agendas and materials for the field-based research teams. The technical team held meetings with each of the LRPs and proposed to conduct one training with key personnel at each LRP (which we are calling LRP-HQ personnel), and to co-conduct a separate training for the local, or field-based, enumerators. The FHI 360 technical team developed draft agendas for each training, proposing a division of responsibilities for the enumerator training between FHI 360 and the LRPs, and shared these with the LRPs. Annex 2 contains the proposed agendas for the LRP-HQ and Enumerator trainings.

## E. Dissemination Plan

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### Validation Workshops:

No activities related to the Validation Workshops were implemented

## F. Challenges

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The biggest challenge this quarter was the delay in getting the subaward packages completed and submitted by FHI 360. This was, in large part, due to a series of smaller obstacles compounding over time, including: revisions to the technical staff which required reworking safety protocols and budgets in collaboration with the LRPs; and internal personnel changes of operational backstops and key reviewers/approvers.

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<sup>58</sup> Here, “equivalent” means communities in other regions of the country with similar-to-same socio-economic and demographic composition.



The FHI 360 technical team has sought, and will continue to seek, ways to make up this time. For example, we intend to add two more people to code the qualitative data, analyse the data on a rolling basis, and encourage simultaneous data collection in the two target communities of each country, insofar as security measures permit.

## **G. Activities Planned for Next Reporting Period**

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The following activities are planned for the next quarter:

1. *Revised qualitative study timeline*

Once the local partners subawards are fully executed, FHI 360 technical team will collaborate with the local partners to adjust the timeline – activities and deliverables – of the qualitative study. This may necessitate FHI 360 submitting a request for a no cost extension to USAID/WA and anticipate discussing this further during one of the bi-weekly calls.

2. *LRP-HQ training*

We intend to conduct a combined virtual training for 3-4 staff from each local research partner. The three-day combined training will enable all three partners and FHI 360 to have a common, shared understanding of the research study goals; help ensure consistency in the data collected; and provide an opportunity for the partners to network and build relationships across the region. We intend to foster these relationships through regular meetings over the course of the study during which the local partners can share their experience and lessons learned, as well as seek out guidance from their peers.

3. *Enumerator training*

There will be three, 5-day hybrid trainings; each will be led by a local partner for their eight selected enumerators. The LRPs will bring the eight enumerators to one location — such as the capital or regional city — for the training while adhering to COVID-19 preventive measures. The FHI 360 technical team will lead some sessions virtually, such as those on research ethics, confidentiality practices, and using the tablets for data collection which will have the questionnaires loaded onto them. We have planned that one day of each training will be a “practicum”. The local enumerators will be put in pairs, one male and one female researcher, given a tablet, and will then conduct a few interview to familiarize themselves with the tablet and also to provide any feedback on the framing/phrasing of the questions. The LRP will make arrangements to conduct these test-interviews with individuals from the target communities who are now residing in the country’s capital or regional city.

4. *Collection of Qualitative Data*

We anticipate starting to collect qualitative data immediately following the enumerator trainings. We will begin with national level key informant interviews (KIIs) which will be conducted by local research partner staff and/or FHI 360’s technical and research officers. While the KIIs are being conducted, the LRP staff will also be able to work with the local enumerators and community-based /civil society organizations (CBOs / CSOs) to recruit and schedule in-depth interviews according to the demographic plan in each target community.

5. *Analysis of Qualitative Data*

The technical team will begin developing a codebook. Then, once some data is collected, the technical team will work with and train the coders to ensure consistent coding and subsequent analysis of the qualitative data collected.

## **H. Financial Summary**

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The chart on the follow page provides a financial snapshot of project spending against the obligation as of December 31, 2020. FHI 360 has submitted the SF-425 for this quarter under separate cover.

| Sahel CVE Research        |              |
|---------------------------|--------------|
| Funds Obligated           | \$734,061.00 |
| Spent, Accrued, Committed | \$146,079.63 |
| Obligation Available      | \$587,981.25 |
|                           |              |
| Percent spent/committed   | 19.90%       |

## I. Success Stories

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There are no success stories to report during this quarter.

## Annexes

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Annex 1: Research determination letter, FHI 360's Office of International Research Ethics

Annex 2: Proposed agendas for local partner-HQ and local enumerator trainings



## Annex 1: Letter from FHI 360 Institutional Review Board



### Office of International Research Ethics

#### EXEMPT RESEARCH DETERMINATION

DATE: December 17, 2020

TO: Robin Nelson

PROJECT #: 1662154-2

TITLE: Gender-Differentiated Drivers of Violent Extremism in the Central Sahel

EXEMPT CATEGORY: Category 2i and 2ii

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Thank you for submitting the human subjects research entitled Gender-Differentiated Drivers of Violent Extremism in the Central Sahel for review by the Office of International Research Ethics (OIRE). We are pleased to inform you this research meets one or more of the exempt categories under 45 CFR 46.104(d).

For research in which limited IRB review is a condition of exemption this review has confirmed that adequate provisions to protect the privacy of participants and to maintain the confidentiality of the data have been satisfied under §46.104(d)(2)(iii), and (d)(3)(i)(C).

It is important to note the exempt determination for this research was based on the documents submitted at this time. Any additions or revisions to the protocol, or any research materials, must be submitted to OIRE for review prior to implementation.

*This letter has been electronically signed in accordance with all applicable regulations, and a copy is retained within FHI 360 records.*

**FHI 360 HEADQUARTERS** 359 Blackwell Street, Suite 200 | Durham, NC 27701 USA  
T 1.919.544.7040 | F 1.919.544.7261 | [www.fhi360.org](http://www.fhi360.org)

## Annex 2: Proposed Information and Training Sessions for Local Partner-HQ Research Teams

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### Day 1

**10:00- 2:30 pm (Burkina Faso and Mali time)**

**11:00 am - 3:30 pm (Niger Time)**

|  |   |
|--|---|
| Introductions, roles and responsibilities in the project   | Burkina Faso/Mali 10:00 - 10:45 a.m.<br>Niger 11:00 - 11:45 |
| Review of the research project   | Burkina Faso/Mali 10:45 - 11:30 a.m.<br>Niger 11:45 - 12:30 |
| Coffee Break   | Burkina Faso/Mali 11:30 - 11:45 a.m.<br>Niger 12:30- 12:45  |
| Organization of work <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Methodology</li> <li>Data Collection Plan</li> </ul> | Burkina Faso/Mali 11:45 - 12:15<br>Niger 12:45 - 1:15       |
| Community Entry and Recruitment Process  | Burkina Faso/Mali 12:15 - 12:45 pm<br>Niger 1:15-1:45       |
| Lunch Break  | Burkina Faso/Mali 12:45 - 1:15<br>Niger 1:45- 2:15          |
| Recruitment Text   | Burkina Faso/Mali 1 :15 - 1 :45<br>Niger 2:15- 2:45         |

### Day 2:

**10:00 am- 12:45 pm (Burkina Faso and Mali time)**

**11:00 – 13 :45 (Niger time)**

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Revision of the guides <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In-depth interviews, community level (1 hour)</li> <li>Community Key Informant Interviews (30 minutes)</li> </ul>   | Burkina Faso/Mali 9:00 - 10:30 a.m.<br>Niger 10:00 - 11:30 |
| Coffee Break  | Burkina Faso/Mali 10:30 - 10 :45<br>Niger 11:30 - 11:45    |
| Continued revision of the guides <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key informant interviews at the national level (30 minutes)</li> </ul>  | Burkina Faso/Mali 10:45 - 11:15 a.m.<br>Niger 11:45-12:15  |
| Tool testing in Kobo <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure that Kobo is installed on the shelves</li> <li>Loading surveys on the shelves</li> <li>Save surveys</li> <li>Submitting surveys to the FHI 360 server</li> </ul> | Burkina Faso/Mali 11:15 - 12:15<br>Niger 12:15- 1:15       |
| Note taking<br>Review the Note-taking Template  | Burkina Faso/Mali 12:15 - 12:45 pm<br>Niger 1:15-1:45      |

**Day 3:****9:00- 11:15 (Burkina Faso and Mali time)****10:00 – 12 :15 (Niger time)**

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Ethical Consideration and Ethical Risk Management <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Revision of consent forms</li></ul> | Burkina Faso/Mali 9:00 - 10:15 a.m.<br>Niger 10:00 - 11:15 |
| Sessions and small groups by country to review safety protocols   | Burkina Faso/Mali 10:15 - 10:30 a.m.<br>Niger 11:15-11:30  |
| Coffee break  | Burkina Faso/Mali 10:30 - 10:45 a.m.<br>Niger 11:30- 11:45 |
| Preparation for the training of enumerators <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Breakout sessions by country</li></ul>    | Burkina Faso/Mali 10:45 - 11:15 a.m.<br>Niger 11:45- 12:15 |

## Annex 2: Proposed Information and Training Sessions for Local/Field-based Enumerators<sup>59</sup>

### Day 1

| Theme   | Responsible/<br>Facilitator   | Schedule      |
|---|---|---------------|
| Introductions, roles and responsibilities in the project  | FHI 360   | 9:00 – 9:45   |
| Review of the research project  | FHI 360   | 9:45 – 10:30  |
| <b>Coffee Break</b>   |   | 10:30 – 10:45 |
| Organization of work <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Methodology</li> <li>• Data Collection Plan</li> </ul>  | Local Research Partner  | 10:45 – 11:15 |
| Community Entry and Recruitment Process   | Local Research Partner  | 11:15 – 11:45 |
| Consent process and review of individual consent forms  | FHI 360   | 11:45 – 12:15 |
| <b>Lunch Break</b>  |   | 12:15 – 1:15  |
| Practice of the consent process in French in groups of 2 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Session 1 (30 min). <i>Then change roles</i></li> <li>• Session 2 (30 min)</li> </ul>       | Local Research Partner  | 1:15 – 2:15   |
| Discussion of consent process issues related to the concepts  | Local Research Partner,<br>with FHI 360 available<br>by chat and/or phone | 2:15 – 2:45   |
| <b>Coffee Break</b>   |   | 2:45 – 3:00   |
| Practice the consent process in local languages in groups of 2 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Session 1 (30 min). <i>Then change roles</i></li> <li>• Session 2 (30 min)</li> </ul> | Local Research Partner  | 3:00 – 4:00   |
| Discussion of issues related to the consent process for terms used in local languages   | Local Research Partner,<br>with FHI 360 available<br>by chat and/or phone | 4:00 – 4:30   |
| Return/Summary of Day 1   | Local Research Partner  | 4:30 – 5:00   |

### Day 2

|  |         |             |
|--|---------|-------------|
| Discussion on best practices in conducting in-depth interviews and best practices in note-taking | FHI 360 | 9:00 – 9:30 |
|--|---------|-------------|

<sup>59</sup> Three different local enumerator trainings will be held; one for each country-team. Thus, the times indicated are local time

|  |   |               |
|--|---|---------------|
| Guide Revision <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community in-depth interviews (30 minutes per hour)</li> <li>Key informant interviews at the community level (15-20 minutes)</li> </ul> <i>Note : Use this session to ensure that everyone understands the concepts in French.</i> | FHI 360   | 9:30 - 10:45  |
| <b>Coffee Break</b>  |   | 10:45 – 11:00 |
| Review of note-taking template   | FHI 360   | 11:00 – 11:15 |
| In-depth community interview practice session in <u>French</u> - groups of 3 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Session 1 (45 minutes). <i>Then change roles</i></li> <li>Session 2 (45 minutes). <i>Then change roles</i></li> </ul>  | Local Research Partner  | 11:15 – 12:45 |
| <b>Lunch Break</b>   |   | 12:45 – 1:45  |
| continued Community-based in-depth interview practice session in <u>French</u> - groups of 3 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Session 3 (45 minutes)</li> </ul>  |   | 1:45 – 2:15   |
| Debriefing practical session   | Local Research Partner, with FHI 360 available by chat and/or phone | 1:45 – 2:00   |
| Community-based in-depth interview practice session in local languages - groups of 3 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Session 1 (45 minutes). <i>Then change roles</i></li> <li>Session 2 (45 minutes). <i>Then change roles</i></li> <li>Session 3 (45 minutes)</li> </ul>        | Local Research Partner  | 2:00 – 4:15   |
| <b>Coffee Break</b>  |   | 4:15 – 4:30   |
| Debriefing of the Hands-on Session to ensure that teams have agreed on equivalent/common terminology in local languages  | Local Research Partner, with FHI 360 available by chat and/or phone | 4:30 – 5:00   |
| Return/Summary of Day 2  | Partners  | 5:00 – 5:30   |

### Day 3

|   |   |               |
|---|---|---------------|
| Practice sessions of key informant interviews at the community level in French - groups of 3 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Session 1 (30 minutes)</li> <li>Session 2 (30 minutes)</li> <li>Session 3 (30 minutes)</li> </ul> | Local Research Partner  | 9:00 – 10:30  |
| <b>Coffee Break</b>   |   | 10:30 – 10:45 |
| Debriefing practical session  | Local Research Partner, with FHI 360 available by chat and/or phone | 10:45 – 11:00 |

|  |   |               |
|--|---|---------------|
| Practice sessions of key informant interviews at the community level in French - in groups of 3 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Session 1 (30 minutes). <i>Then change roles</i></li> <li>• Session 2 (30 minutes). <i>Then change roles</i></li> <li>• Session 3 (30 minutes)</li> </ul> | Local Research Partner  | 11:00 – 12:30 |
| <b>Lunch Break</b>   |   | 12:30 – 1:30  |
| Debriefing of the Hands-on Session to ensure that teams have agreed on equivalent terminology in local languages   |   | 1:30 - 2:00   |
| Data Management <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assigning identities to notes</li> <li>• Loading surveys on the shelves</li> <li>• Archiving of Surveys</li> <li>• Survey submission on the FHI 360 server</li> </ul>   | Local Research Partner, with FHI 360 available by chat and/or phone | 2:00 – 2:45   |
| Ethical considerations and ethical risk management   | FHI 360   | 2:45 – 3:15   |
| <b>Coffee Break</b>  |   | 3:15 – 3:30   |
| Logistics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Security Protocols</li> <li>• Materials and documentation required for fieldwork</li> </ul>   | Local Research Partner  | 3:30 – 4:15   |
| Preparation of the survey testing and testing of research tools <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assignment of teams</li> <li>• Confirmation of sites/times</li> <li>• Preparation of materials</li> </ul>   | Local Research Partner  | 4:15 – 4:45   |
| Quiz/Debrief of Days 1-3   | FHI 360   | 4:45 – 5:15   |

#### Day 4

Field-based practicum: Survey testing and testing of research tools

#### Day 5

|  |   |                  |
|--|---|------------------|
| Debrief Investigation and testing of research tools                              | Local Research Partner, with FHI 360 available by chat and/or phone | 9:00 – 9:45      |
| Review of necessary revisions to research tools                                  | FHI 360   | 9:45 – 10:45     |
| <b>Coffee Break</b>  |   | 10:45 – 11:00    |
| Review of fieldwork schedule/plan  | Local Research Partner  | 11:00 – 12:30    |
| <b>Lunch Break</b>   |   | 12:30 – 1:30     |
| Fieldwork preparation (i.e., printing, organizing materials, revising schedules) | Local Research Partner, with FHI 360 available by chat and/or phone | 1:30 – 3:00/3:30 |